Australian High Commission
New Zealand

Speech to the New Zealand Advanced Command and Staff College 24 April 2026

Speech to the New Zealand Advanced Command and Staff College
24 April 2026

HE Daniel Sloper, PSM, High Commissioner, Australia

 

E ngā mana, e ngā reo, e ngā iwi, e rau rangatira mā.

Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa.

Thank you for the invitation to join you today. It is great to be back at Trentham to be speaking with the people who will be putting policy and strategy into action.

At the outset, I’d like to acknowledge the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel MacBeth, and host students Major Oliver and Major Lynn.

I started today with an acknowledgement in Te Reo Māori. 

As an Australian I would like to follow our practice and acknowledge the traditional custodians of the land on which we meet today, recognise their legacy and the role they play in caring for the land and waters of this region. I also pay my respects to their Elders past, present and emerging and extend this to any indigenous leaders in the room.

I encourage you to listen critically to my presentation today. I will speak on the challenges to security, Australia’s defence policies and posture, our strategic alignment with New Zealand, our shared commitment to support a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, and more.

If I don’t cover an issue of interest or my comments provoke a question, please do raise these. I will deliberately leave time for questions and a discussion at the end of my remarks. I value this sort of discussion and debate as it is through such contestation that we test ideas, sharpen our thinking and learn.

As you prepare for your Australian Study Tour, I’d also like to thank you for your service, commitment to your countries, and contributions to collective security.

 

ANZAC Day

It is not lost on me that I am talking to you on the eve of ANZAC Day, a solemn time of commemoration and reflection for both Australia and New Zealand.

The Australian High Commission and Australian Defence Force representatives posted to New Zealand or visiting from Canberra are honoured to be participating in ANZAC Day ceremonies in 16 sites across New Zealand this year.

These ceremonies serve as an important reminder of the ultimate sacrifice made by so many in war, conflict, and peacekeeping operations.

ANZAC Day is also an opportunity to remember and thank personnel such as yourselves who are currently serving – at home and overseas, away from family, friends, and loved ones.

 

The global strategic environment …

Let me now turn to the global strategic environment.

The world is becoming less certain, and more challenging for all countries, including Australia and New Zealand.

In his State of the Nation Speech in January, Prime Minister Luxon spoke about three significant shifts. He argued that the world was grappling with fundamental shifts from:

  1. rules to power;

  2. economics to security; and

  3. efficiency to resilience.

Strategic competition is now a permanent feature of the Indo-Pacific region, and is playing out across multiple domains, including diplomacy, the economy, development, and military competition.

The risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation is high. Conflict is more widespread now than at any time since the Second World War.

The war in Ukraine, regional conflict in the Middle East, instability in parts of Africa and Southeast Asia are reshaping norms and expectations.

Grey‑zone activities — cyber operations, disinformation, coercion –   activities below the threshold of war, are now part of daily life.

Australia’s 2026 National Defence Strategy was released last week. I’ll speak on it further, but note that building on the 2024 Strategy, it assesses that we have entered a more dangerous and unpredictable era.

An era characterised by a more overt struggle among states where the thresholds against the use of force are being eroded.

The coming decade is likely to be defined by more intense strategic competition, compounding security challenges, coercion as a feature of statecraft, and technological advancements, all of which expose Australia to elevated levels of risk.

 

 … with challenges increasingly complex and no longer distant

For most of their modern histories, Australia and New Zealand took some comfort from their geography.

Geography worked in our favour.

It bought time.

It reduced pressure.

It allowed a certain optimism — that even if things went wrong elsewhere, we’d feel it later, and less severely.

That model is gone.

As former Defence Minister Judith Collins said:

Distance is no longer a protection. New Zealand’s geographic
isolation does not shelter us from threats to the extent it has in the past.

Australia’s strategic warning time for conflict has reduced from ten years to near-zero, meaning a major power conflict in the Indo-Pacific is no longer a distant prospect.

Today, events thousands of kilometres away shape our security almost immediately.

A missile test in Northeast Asia rattles markets in Auckland.

Cyber activity in Eastern Europe hits Australian hospitals.

Trade coercion in one part of the Indo‑Pacific reverberates in supply chains elsewhere.

Your service, and Study Tour to Australia, comes at a time of profound change in our region.

China’s military build‑up is the largest in the world, and it’s occurring without strategic reassurance.

Threats are increasingly borderless.

Cyber incursions are an ever-present threat.

The range of weaponry is increasing.

Maritime and air trade routes are stretched.

And our connections to the world remain dependent on a small number of undersea cables and space-based services.

These are significant challenges. However, they do not mean conflict is inevitable.

 

Using all tools of statecraft

Australia understands that international rules and norms – even when challenged – have delivered clear benefits.

Australia does not want a world where disputes are resolved by power alone – by the use or threat or force.

We prosper in a system where disputes are resolved by engagement, negotiation and by reference to international rules and norms.

So, Australia is working to support a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, in which sovereignty is respected, strategic balance is possible, and conflict is deterred.

Australia is pursuing this objective using all tools of statecraft to protect our security and advance our interests.

We do this by strengthening relations, working in partnership in our region, building resilience, and supporting rules.

On defence, we do this on the basis that deterrence, credibility, and preparedness matter.

Deterrence – be it diplomatic, economic, or military – is about collectively making the costs of conflict higher.

 

2026 National Defence Strategy

Australia’s 2026 National Defence Strategy continues the Government’s approach to address Australia’s most significant risks.

It is underpinned by four key concepts.

First, National Defence is a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach harnessing all arms of national power.

Second, a strategy of denial to deter any conflict, prevent coercion of Australia, support regional security and prosperity, and uphold a favourable strategic balance.

Third, integration; the Australian Defence Force must be integrated across five domains – maritime, land, air, space and cyber – and with international partners.

Fourth, self-reliance; enhancing our ability to employ and sustain credible military power in a crisis or conflict.

The National Defence Strategy directs continued action in support of these concepts, including:

  • prioritising capability acquisition and sustainment plans to deliver a strategy of denial and increase self-reliance, drawing on lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East;

 

  • strengthening the resilience of Australia’s sovereign defence industrial base and building stronger, more diverse international industrial partnerships;

  • improving national civil preparedness and national resilience to protect Australia from global disruptions and raise the costs of coercion or conflict; and

 

  • increasing coordination with regional partners to collectively deter actions inimical to our shared interests, build resilience and support a region governed by rights and rules, not fear and force.

 

Relationships matter more than ever …

The challenges outlined earlier apply not just to Australia.

It is no coincidence that the New Zealand Government, through its Defence Capability Plan, is making similar investments to ensure the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is equipped for a more dangerous world.

Australia and New Zealand are sovereign countries, and each Government will always make its own decisions based on its national interest, but we share a similar strategic outlook and interests.

We are also partners.

In an insecure world, friends and partners matter. For Australia, there  no more trusted partner than New Zealand.

Australia and New Zealand’s Alliance is more important than ever.

And as former Minister for Defence Judith Collins has said the Australia-New Zealand relationship has never been better.

The Alliance is the foundation of Australia and New Zealand’s foreign policy and defence partnership. It is built on trust, shared values and collective security.

We cooperate across the range of our interests, bilaterally, regionally, and internationally.

Our relationship is one of the closest in the world and is built on deep connections well beyond security cooperation spanning history, economics, community, and personal links.

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty that underpins our Alliance.

What is valuable about the Alliance isn’t its age or its enduring nature. It is how it has evolved to address contemporary and future challenges.

This is not by chance. It reflects a commitment from both sides.

This was demonstrated in the annual Australia-New Zealand Ministerial Meeting (ANZMIN) in March, which brought together our respective defence and foreign ministers.

Defence Ministers committed to practical action to strengthen our strategic alignment, interoperability, preparedness, and ability to contribute to a stronger and more resilient Pacific family.

This commitment was made publicly in an Operationalising the Australia-New Zealand Alliance: Anzac 2035 - Closer Defence Relations Statement.

The ANZAC 2035 Statement committed to:

  • an integrated Anzac force by 2035;

    • respecting national sovereignty, Australia and New Zealand will progressively operationalise the Alliance to enable seamless, combat‑capable, and interoperable military operations;

  • an expanded force posture, operations, and exercises,

    • including through rotational force activities, more complex combined exercises (such as Exercise Talisman Sabre), embedded personnel, and increased integration across domains.

  • stronger preparedness, resilience, and defence industry integration,

    • focussing on shared logistics, common platforms, supply‑chain resilience, reduced industry barriers, and co‑development or sustainment of capabilities where it makes sense; and

  • enhanced Pacific security cooperation;

    • Australia and New Zealand will expand combined activities in the Pacific, support Pacific‑led security solutions, including the Pacific Response Group, and strengthen maritime security.

This statement is not mere symbolism.

It is our shared vision of being able to operate seamlessly as an increasingly integrated, combat capable ANZAC force by 2035, while remaining respectful of our status as two sovereign countries.

This cooperation is not new.

It builds on decades of previous work, supported by strong foundations and shared interests.

Australia and New Zealand agreed to Closer Defence Relations building on our Alliance in 1991.

The ANZAC 2035 Statement is an evolution in our cooperation, complements the National Defence Strategy, and responds to the evolving security challenges we face.

 

The Pacific: our immediate region

As Pacific nations, Australia and New Zealand understand that our success and our security is tied to that of our Pacific region and partners.

Australia’s National Defence Strategy and New Zealand’s Defence Capability Plan make it clear that the Indo-Pacific is a primary geographical theatre for strategic competition.

We are seeing rising competition and tensions playing out across the region.

The Indo-Pacific is also home to compounding security challenges.

In addition to the geopolitical challenges, natural disasters, exacerbated by climate change, will continue to impact the region’s security and strain emergency response systems.

Pacific leaders are clear that their primary security concern is climate change. 

Why? Because it erodes resilience, sovereignty, and stability simultaneously.

Climate change and natural disasters don’t respect borders. Political instability doesn’t stay local. Maritime insecurity doesn’t stop at EEZ lines.

That is why disaster response deployments matter.

Why listening matters.

Why Australia and New Zealand will continue to work through, and support regional architecture – supporting Pacific-led solutions to regional security challenges.

And why initiatives like the Pacific Response Group (PRG) matter and why Australia and New Zealand are keen to support it.

The PRG is comprised of militaries from our region (Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Australia).

It was formed so that we collectively and more coherently respond to calls for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from our neighbours.

Working with our Pacific partners, we must now focus on embedding the PRG as a regional asset, which can more effectively deploy in times of need.

In this regard, it is great to see the work underway to transition the PRG Command to New Zealand, which will take effect in a few months’ time. 

 

Interoperability - Strategy and capability tested in practice

I’ve outlined Australia’s strategic objectives, our defence policy, our close alignment with New Zealand and commitment to the region, its resilience, and rules.  This is vital.

It is also vital that it is tested in practice, refined and credible.

That is why our Defence Ministers committed to ‘operationalise’ the alliance. This is a commitment to enhance our capability and interoperability, and to go further.

And it is already happening – in strategic and policy exchanges, exercises, staff secondments and industry consultations. 

Let me give you one very tangible example.

From February to March this year, an aircraft from the Royal New Zealand Air Force’s (RNZAF) 40 Squadron with crew and detachment deployed to Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Richmond for Exercise Trojan Compass.

Throughout this deployment, 40 Squadron were not operating alongside the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

They were embedded within it – working hand in glove with the RAAF 37 squadron.

Flying under Australian call signs.

Fully integrated into ADF tasking.

Supporting operations across Australia, the Southwest Pacific, and into Southeast Asia.

Over five weeks, they flew over a hundred hours, moved nearly a hundred tonnes of cargo and payload — and achieved certification that allows RNZAF maintainers to work directly on RAAF aircraft.

The exercise focused on "interchangeability," allowing New Zealand crews to operate directly within the RAAF logistics and maintenance framework.

It was designed to improve interoperability, maintenance, and medical collaboration. Over five weeks, this in-depth collaboration ensured that both ANZAC forces could work together in future operations.

That’s not theory.

It is practice.

And it is trust – built ahead of crisis.

This interoperability is not new. It is building on a strong, pre-existing base.

During Exercise Talisman Sabre, from 13 July to 4 August last year, the NZDF contributed around 600 personnel, ANZAC-class frigate HMNZS Te Kaha, a P-8A Poseidon aircraft, and three NH90 helicopters.

This was a significant contribution of personnel and assets.

It reflects the desire from both Governments to work in lockstep and be a force multiplier for each other.

Another display of this trust and the increasingly deep level of integration between our two forces is the Deputy Commander positions of Australia and New Zealand’s respective Joint Forces.

Each position is filled by an officer from the other country. 

Each position is integrated with full responsibilities and command when senior officers are absent.

Nationality is not relevant, but capability and experience built on trust.

In addition to these formal embedded positions, we have seen countless exchanges of officials and personnel this year.

In the 12 months to April 2026, we had over 470 Australian defence personnel and officials visit New Zealand.

In reverse, in the last six months, nearly 600 New Zealand personnel and officials have visited Australia.

These exchanges and interactions – like the one you are about to embark on – are a crucial part of strengthening cross-institutional knowledge and understanding, building the platform for ongoing interoperability.

While we have come along way with building interoperability, we aren’t finished yet. We are pursuing ways to further streamline the process through which we embed into each other’s forces.

Pursuing interchangeability, a step beyond interoperability, is an iterative process, but we are learning and improving each time.

 

The Australia–New Zealand relationship is one of our greatest strategic advantages

I have not touched on challenges in newer areas, including grey zone activities or cyber and our responses.

Rather, I have focused on other global challenges, strategy, capability and interoperability.

Let me finish where I began before we turn to questions and a discussion.

In an era of mounting geostrategic uncertainty, no nation can meet complex security, economic, and technological challenges alone.

Enduring partnerships—rooted in trust, shared values, and practical cooperation—are not optional, but essential.

Australia and New Zealand are aligned closely in our strategic outlook and shared interests.

Our governments have committed to lift Defence capability and our capacity to work together to address challenges in times of conflict, crisis or in response to disasters and other challenges.

The Australia–New Zealand Alliance stands as an example.

An example of how close partners can amplify each other’s resilience and influence.

An example that demonstrates that, working together, like‑minded nations are better equipped to safeguard stability, deter coercion, and shape a more secure and prosperous region.

We – Australia, New Zealand, all of us - face increasing strategic competition, instability, and compounding security challenges.

What protects us now are:

  • strong relationships

  • credible capabilities

  • integration with trusted partners

  • and a willingness to uphold the rules and norms that provide a transparent, predictable basis on which to pursue our national interests.

In my view, for Australia and New Zealand, our bilateral relationship is one of our strategic advantages.

But it is not self‑sustaining or automatic.

It needs to be active, refreshed, and developed in response to changes in each country and the challenges we face.

That responsibility rests with all of us, but increasingly with you.

I have every confidence you will be equal to it.

Thank you — and I look forward to your questions.

Ngā mihi nui.

No reira, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa.