High Commissioner: Address to Asia New Zealand Foundation
High Commissioner Address to the Asia New Zealand Foundation
20 February 2025
E ngā mana, e ngā reo, e ngā iwi, e rau rangatira mā
Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa.
I’d like to acknowledge the members of the diplomatic corps and representatives of the NZ Government here in the room with us today.
And I also want to express my sincere thanks to Suz and the Asia New Zealand Foundation for hosting me this evening, for what I’m sure will be a very interesting discussion.
I have less than a month left in my tenure as Australian High Commissioner to New Zealand. And while I’m sad that my time in New Zealand is coming to an end, I find myself reflecting on what I’ve learnt about the relationship in the past few years.
One of my big reflections is that despite all our similarities, Australia and New Zealand sometimes see things in slightly different ways.
On foreign policy, our outlook is coloured by our economies, our geographies and our individual cultures. To illustrate this, what I thought I’d do today is sketch out the way that Australia looks at our region – with a particular focus on Asia – and how this has changed over time.
The Asia-Pacific
I’m speaking to you not just as an outgoing High Commissioner, but also as someone who has had a 38-year career in foreign policy.
When I first joined the foreign service in the late 1980s, Australia looked at our region - a region we then called the ‘Asia-Pacific’ – as one filled with great economic opportunity.
This was an era when Asian markets were growing at double digits – China, Korea and Singapore all had growth figures of 11 or 12 per cent annually.
The world’s fastest growing economies were right on our doorstep. Their thirst for mineral resources, food and fibre products to supply their industrialising economies were a perfect match for Australian (and New Zealand) exports. Naturally, trade flourished and we began to develop very deep links that persist to this day.
Coming out of our own period of economic uncertainty, Australia wanted to make the most of the opportunity. Our government began to think about how it could institutionalise these economic links. As then-Prime Minister Bob Hawke said before departing on a trip to North Asia in 1984 – we were seeking to become ‘enmeshed’ in Asia.
And so the idea of the Asia-Pacific Economic Community – or APEC – was born.
Australia was very proud to be so closely associated with the establishment of APEC in 1989. The concept stemmed from a desire by many to establish common regional trading rules.
Over time, it was only natural that we started to think about deepening our economic relationships in the Asia-Pacific to include security dimensions as well.
We joined the ASEAN Regional Forum as a founding member in 1994 and we were also one of the participants at the inaugural East Asia Summit in 2005.
And, in 1995, the Keating Government announced the successful negotiation of a formal joint security agreement between Australia and Indonesia – Australia’s first dedicated security agreement with a non-Western partner.
In doing so, Prime Minister Keating brought to life his dictum that ‘Australia must find its security in Asia, not from Asia’.
A changing region
We find ourselves today, a quarter-way through the twenty-first century, in a very different Asia.
Since the 1990s, we have seen countries like China and India sustain incredible growth – both in terms of population and economic size.
I don’t need to tell this audience how consequential the rise of these economies has been. In fact, it can’t be overstated. Today, China is the largest trading partner for over 120 countries. Its growth since the late 70s has lifted over 800 million people out of poverty. In any terms, that is a remarkable human achievement.
Though less dramatic, we have seen similar dynamics elsewhere in the region – in India, in Vietnam and across Southeast Asia.
The global economic centre of gravity has well and truly shifted away from the Northern Hemisphere and towards our region.
Inevitably, this scale of economic change has come with complexity.
For instance, as China has cemented itself as a great economic power, it is only natural that it has sought to match its economic size with greater strategic weight.
This is to be expected – it’s what great powers do.
We have, however, expressed concerns at how China has chosen to deploy its strategic weight.
We have seen aggressive conduct and rising tensions in the South China Sea, economic coercion and challenges to the international rules and norms on which we rely.
Across the Indo-Pacific, we are seeing the greatest military buildup since the Second World War.
All of this has combined to increase regional strategic anxiety.
These developments have compelled Australia – and many others – to clarify our foreign policy goals. To focus on all of the levers of our statecraft on the things that really matter to us.
In the Indo-Pacific, we seek a region that is safe, prosperous and stable.
Where no country dominates, and no country is dominated.
And where all nations can pursue their sovereign choices free from interference.
The Indo-Pacific
You’ll notice that I’m starting to use the phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’. This is the framing you’ll now hear from Australian foreign policy practitioners. And its for a good reason.
In simplest terms, the Indo-Pacific concept reflects our geography – recognising Australia’s distinctive geostrategic position as a continent that faces two oceans.
The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ also seeks to reflect the interconnected nature of the region – one linked by strategic maritime and trade routes. It embraces both economic and strategic concepts.
For Australia, the Indo-Pacific is the region where our primary interests are engaged and where we focus our foreign and strategic policy efforts.
We don’t kid ourselves that Australia can achieve our foreign policy goals alone. Collective security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific can only be secured with collective effort.
Friends, allies, partnerships and coalitions are essential.
Among these is the Quad, a partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The Quad has its foundations in the collaboration between those four countries in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.
Today, it is delivering a positive and practical agenda for the Indo-Pacific – focusing on the region’s priorities and most pressing challenges.
We’re also working hard to boost our economic engagement with Southeast Asia – a region we know will be the fourth largest economy by 2040, after the United States, China and India.
Our Special Envoy to Southeast Asia, Mr Nicholas Moore, has led work to develop a pioneering Southeast Asia Economic Strategy, which we launched last year. Since then, we’ve set up a $2 billion Southeast Asia investment finance facility and are developing a pipeline of Australian investment projects for the region – particularly in clean energy and infrastructure.
And in the Pacific we are focused on actively listening to our Pacific partners and elevating their priorities.
To do this well we know we must be present in the region. Since 2018 we have established an Australian post in every Pacific Islands Forum country.
We’ve heard our Pacific partners when they say climate change is their biggest security challenge – and that’s why we’re making large investments to support climate mitigation and adaptation across the region, including contributing at least $350 million in climate infrastructure for the Pacific.
These efforts are all part of a bigger picture. Australia is using all levers of statecraft at our disposal, cooperating with likeminded partners to maintain the regional strategic balance as well as to support regional prosperity.
Conclusion
I cannot conclude without considering where New Zealand fits in this picture.
Of all our friends and partners in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps none is closer to Australia than New Zealand.
However, when we approach the Indo-Pacific, our starting points are inevitably slightly different.
New Zealand, for one, does not have an Indian Ocean presence. That’s just a fact of geography.
But New Zealand is not immune to the facts of geopolitical reality either.
Just as Australia is doing, New Zealand is now investing great energy in building active and constructive relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific – from traditional partners in the Pacific, across North and Southeast Asia, and now in deepening its relationships with India and South Asia.
In doing so, Australia understands and respects that New Zealand will inevitably bring its own strengths and perspectives to its engagement. It will do things its own way.
For Australia, this is all very welcome.
The challenges of our shared region mean that the trans-Tasman relationship – with all our commonalities and differences – has never had more relevance than it does now.
We have a deep level of trust and confidence in each other, built over more than a century of shared history and experience.
Today, in an increasingly volatile global environment, that trust is a powerful strategic asset.
Over the past three years I have seen us put this trust into practical action.
There has been a tangible uplift in how we work together to address the challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific. We are now working together more closely and with a greater sense of purpose, than has been the case in recent years.
So I depart Wellington with a sense of optimism, that Australia and New Zealand are on a path to a stronger and more mature partnership, one that is genuinely fit to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.
