Speech to the NZDF Advanced Command and Staff Course at Trentham

Speech to the Advanced Command and Staff Course
Daniel Sloper, High Commissioner, Australia

Trentham, May 2^nd, 2025

 

E ngā mana, e ngā reo, e ngā iwi, e rau rangatira mā

Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa.

 

Good morning,

 

My thanks to the Commanding Officer of the Command and Staff College, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, for the invitation to address you today prior to your Australian Study Tour.

 

Thank you also to LCDR Alissa Auld for your introduction.

 

It is my pleasure to visit Trentham and share my views on the Australia-New Zealand partnership.  Following my talk, I look forward to a dynamic discussion based on any questions you may have.  

 

Australia is currently in an election period, which means that public officials like myself are subject to ‘caretaker conventions’.  I can’t speculate on who might win the election or new policy positions. 

 

But Australia’s foreign policy settings largely receive bipartisan support.  Regardless of which party forms government, there is a common understanding of the strategic challenges the Indo-Pacific region faces and the value of our partnership with New Zealand.

 

Before turning to the extensive defence relationship that Australia and New Zealand share, I’d like to set out some of the context within which our relationship operates.

 

Global context

 

Globally, the environment is rapidly changing.

 

In many ways, our world may already be unrecognisable from the one when you started your careers. 

 

Each day our assessments are tested.  In an environment of increasing strategic uncertainty, we can no longer be sure that the assumptions we have relied on for years remain true.

 

For one, we can no longer assume that peace is likely.  There is now more conflict than any time since the Second World War.  As the Australian foreign and defence ministers have noted, our world is facing the most complex strategic circumstances at any time since the end of the Second World War.

 

We are seeing conflict in Sudan.  In Myanmar.  In the Middle East.  And in Ukraine.

 

Alongside that, grey zone tactics, and coercive practices are also spreading.

 

Meanwhile, the threat of nuclear weapons is again on the rise, while the advent of cyber warfare and AI has changed how we think about defence and security.

 

Second, these challenges are compounded by growing uncertainty about the role of international institutions and the rule of law.  

We can no longer assume there is consensus on respect for the international system of rules and norms.

 

Some countries are casting aside the institutions we have built since the end of the Second World War.  While reform of some multilateral organisations is needed to meet contemporary challenges, this cannot be a means for powerful states to dismantle protections for smaller countries.

 

Russia’s illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine is an example of flagrant disregard for established international law and norms.

 

Third, the unipolar world we have experienced since the end of the Cold War is being challenged.  Powers such as India and China are increasingly asserting their place in the world.

 

Fourth, Australia’s key strategic partner, the United States, is pursuing a different vision for its role in the world.  This, of course, is what President Trump campaigned on and what the American people chose, so we should not be surprised by the policy direction of this Administration.  

 

The imposition of tariffs on Australia, however, as our Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has said, “is against the spirit of our two nations, enduring friendship and fundamentally at odds with the benefits our economic partnership has delivered over more than 70 years.”

 

Notwithstanding this difference, it is important to remember that Australia continues to have deep shared interests with the United States, a key ally and partner.

 

Indo-Pacific regional context

 

Focusing closer to home, Australia, New Zealand and other states are facing increasing geo-strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, including the potential for conflict.

 

Australia has always enjoyed a degree of protection through its remote geography, as has New Zealand.  But today, neither distance nor geography can insulate us.  

 

Strategic competition is already in our neighbourhood and combat in domains such as cyber are geography agnostic.

 

Australia understands that the Indo-Pacific faces significant challenges. I will mention a few.

 

First, we need to work together with others across the region to protect the rules-based order that has underpinned our collective stability, peace and prosperity.  We do this this through political commitments, statements and in practice.

 

Recently, for example, the Royal Australian Navy and a Royal New Zealand Air Force aircraft conducted a routine transit in the South China Sea.  This is not unusual.  Australia will continue to exercise freedom of navigation and overflight to uphold international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

 

We do this jointly with New Zealand and others to underline our common interests.  The less unified we are, the more likely it is that our vulnerabilities will be exploited.

 

This is not just a question of law.  Open sea lanes and lines of communication underpin global trade and the economic prosperity of Australia, New Zealand and our region.

 

Second, militarisation is rising in the Indo-Pacific.  China is building a military capability – including a nuclear weapons force – that seeks parity with the United States.  As Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Marles has said:
 

Confidence – and indeed trust – in Chinese intent will be the single most important ingredient to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.  And by extension it will be at the heart of building a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.  

 

This leads to the third point, there is potential for missteps in the strategic sphere.  Any miscalculation in the South China Sea or Taiwan, for example, could lead to a conflict that would be catastrophic to the region’s stability and prosperity.

 

Fourth, climate change is a global challenge that undermines security by weakening economic and social resilience.  Pacific Island states are clear that climate change is a key security priority, and its destabilising impact is now recognised in the security documents of many countries.
 

Working with other states

 

These are significant challenges, but we don’t manage them alone.  Like others across the Indo-Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand are grappling with these shifts, by working together.

 

One way we can support peace, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific is to support an effective multilateral system. 

 

Australia does not want a world where disputes are resolved by power alone – by the use or threat of force.

 

We prosper in a system where disputes are resolved by engagement, negotiation and by reference to international rules and norms.  And where the sovereignty of all countries is respected, regardless of their size, so that no one country dominates.

 

At the regional level, multilateral bodies such as the Pacific Islands Forum are part of an essential architecture that shapes external engagement in the region, mediates points of contention, allocates development support and unites the region’s voice.

 

Diversifying and strengthening our partnerships gives Australia more choices over our future in an insecure and unstable world.  These relationships help us to respond to the evolving global context.

 

The US remains our principal strategic partner and New Zealand is our closest partner.  Our alliances lie at the heart of our relationships.  We share a common ambition for our countries to be secure, safe and prosperous.

 

It’s worth noting, including in the current election context, that Australia has an enduring, bipartisan commitment to both alliances.  Both our major political parties consider the alliances critical to the security and prosperity of Australia, our partners and the Indo-Pacific region.

 

Australia is also proud to be building stronger relationships with India, Japan, South Korea and the countries of Southeast Asia.

 

The Pacific

 

In our immediate neighbourhood, we have also been working to strengthen relationships with our Pacific family.  

 

An important part of this is listening to our Pacific neighbours about their security priorities.  We hear that elements outside of a ‘traditional’ security lens are a big concern.  This includes climate change, illegal, underreported and unregulated fishing, drug trafficking and people smuggling.

 

We have thought creatively about how to build enduring and mutually beneficial partnerships that jointly address these concerns.  

 

Our climate migration pact with Tuvalu, the Falepili Union, is one such example.  Similarly, our security agreements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea are designed to reflect a modern bilateral relationship that is responsive to the global environment and national priorities.  Not to mention, in the case of our agreement with PNG, our shared love of rugby league.

 

New Zealand

 

Bringing this discussion closer again, Australia has no deeper and more comprehensive relationship than with New Zealand.

 

Our shared interests, values, histories and people-to-people connections underpin the extensive cooperation between our two countries.

 

We have free movement for our people across our borders; Kiwis and Aussies can live, work and study on either side of the Tasman.

Our Closer Economic Relations Agreement signed in 1983 is a gold standard free trade agreement.  Our single economic market creates a seamless business environment across both countries.  

 

Every day we work together, across almost every issue and every aspect of government.

 

In foreign policy, we align our unique skills and strengths to work together to navigate global and regional challenges.  

 

We work so closely with New Zealand that our diplomatic missions in some countries, such as the Cook Islands, even share offices.  And we exchange staff in our military, foreign affairs, trade and security agencies.

 

With the world changing so much, there is a premium on such a trusted, integrated relationship.  As we navigate uncertainty, this trans-Tasman partnership has fresh relevance for our shared interests.

 

The Australia / New Zealand Military Relationship

 

Reflecting on what this might mean for you, as members of the Profession of Arms, you will no doubt be aware that Australia and New Zealand have an extensive history of military collaboration.

 

We have fought side-by-side in wars.  Most famously on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915, but also more recently in contemporary conflicts such as Afghanistan.

 

Most of our collaboration, however, happens outside times of direct conflict.

 

We serve alongside each other in peacekeeping missions – most extensively in Timor Leste following its independence from Indonesia in 1999.  

And our militaries are increasingly responding together to issues within the Indo-Pacific, such as the 2024 riots in New Caledonia and earthquake in Vanuatu.

 

ANZUS

 

The ANZUS treaty remains the basis for our defence partnership today.

 

Agreed in 1951,  theANZUS Treaty was formed between Australia, New Zealand and the United States when the Cold War was in full swing.  It enshrined a trilateral doctrine of mutual defence and aimed to ensure collective security in the Pacific.

 

The treaty was the basis for Australian and New Zealand participation in conflicts such as the Korean War in the 1950s and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s.

 

As many of you know, New Zealand was suspended from ANZUS in 1986 when it initiated a nuclear-free zone in its territorial waters.  Consequently, New Zealand and the US no longer observe their treaty obligations to each other, however, the treaty was never formally abrogated.  As such, the ANZUS Treaty still forms the basis of the Australia / New Zealand alliance – which is more active than ever.

 

Closer Defence Relations statement

 

Our shared commitment to the alliance and the scope of our cooperation is regularly confirmed and updated.  

 

Most recently, our Defence Ministers signed a Closer Defence Relations (CDR) statement following the December 2024 Australia / New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (ANZMIN).

 

This is the most contemporary expression of what the ANZUS alliance means to both countries.

 

The statement provides government direction to strengthen our alliance and affirms that new domains – such as cyber – are included in the modern interpretation of ANZUS.

 

 

It also outlines five shared defence objectives.  They are that we:

1. contribute to collective security and maintenance of the global rules-based order;

2. increase effectiveness in our combined operations.

3. enhance interoperability;

4. support Pacific sovereign security; and

5. increase the effectiveness of our defence industry collaboration.

 

These political commitments are reinforced by pacts, treaties and statements.  

 

In practical terms, they are expressed in the strategies that our defence forces pursue, the capabilities that they acquire and the combined operations that they undertake.  

 

We recognise that strategy without capability, or capability without strategy will not allow us to effectively pursue our objectives. And practice – combined operations – means we are better prepared.

 

 

National Defence Strategy

 

In 2024, Australia released a National Defence Strategy (NDS).

 

This was the first time that we introduced the concept of National Defence.  Importantly, this is a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of Australia’s national power to defend Australia and advance our interests.

 

National Defence complements broader initiatives that aim to integrate statecraft, and build national, industry and supply chain resilience.

 

The National Defence Strategy outlines a strategy of denial through deterrence.

 

This means that we seek to deter potential adversaries from taking actions that would be against Australia’s interests, such as threatening regional stability.

 

The strategy of denial involves changing a potential adversary’s belief that they could achieve their ambitions with military force at an acceptable cost.

 

With partners like the US and New Zealand, the strategy of denial, ensures that no country attempts to achieve its regional objectives through military action.  

 

By signalling a credible ability to hold potential adversary forces at risk, the strategy also seeks to deter attempts to coerce Australia through force.

 

The Strategy also calls for an integrated, focused force.

 

By integrated, we mean a force that can fight together across all five warfighting domains (air, land, maritime, space, cyber).

 

By focused, we mean a force that is designed for warfighting and focused on achieving specific warfighting tasks.

 

 

This reflects a change from our previous balanced force structure, which was required to do a little bit of everything: from fighting fires to humanitarian assistance, through to contributing to global security tasks and fighting wars.

 

With our change in strategy, there are now some key differences between Australia and New Zealand that warrant consideration by this audience in particular:

 

Australia will have a focused force while New Zealand maintains a balanced force.  What problems or opportunities will this present? 

 

Australia’s strategy of denial means that our force generation activities will have a deterrence outcome.  To what extent does New Zealand want to contribute to collective deterrence when it participates in exercises with Australia?

 

These are live issues that are being discussed in the Australian and New Zealand systems and reflect an alliance that is active, adaptive and responsive to contemporary challenges.

 

This pivot in strategy has also required Australia to rethink the military capabilities that it acquires.

 

Military Capability Acquisition

 

In 2024, Australia released an Integrated Investment Program (IIP) that supports the pursuit of the National Defence Strategy.

 

Our integrated, focused force, built around a strategy of denial, requires:

 

A larger and more lethal Navy, with more surface ships and conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

 

An Army that is optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces, with long range strike capabilities.

 

A highly capable Air Force that can provide air support for integrated operations by conducting surveillance, air defence, strike and transport.

 

The strengthening of cyber capabilities to protect networks and systems and provided enhanced cyber and electronic warfare effects.

 

And, integrated space capabilities to provide space-based situational awareness and communications.

 

To rebuild this force, our immediate priorities are to advance our conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability, while enhancing our long-range strike capabilities and our Guided Weapon and Explosive Ordnance enterprise.

 

We also need to strengthen our northern bases and improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled workforce.

 

Concurrently, our reshaped force requires a boost in innovation and the prioritisation of partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

 

All of this change to our force also requires an increase in government commitment to Defence.  

The Australian Government is investing an additional 5.7 billion Australian dollars over the next four years, and 50.3 billion Australian dollars over the next decade.

 

This means that defence funding as a proportion of GDP will rise to around 2.4% of GDP by 2033-34.

 

With last month’s release of the Defence Capability Plan (DCP), New Zealand is on a similar investment trajectory.

 

New Zealand’s defence expenditure is planned to double to more than 2.1% of GDP over the next eight years.

 

The Defence Capability Plan also highlighted that a core focus for New Zealand is to acquire capabilities that can integrate or interoperate with Australian platforms – demonstrating just how important our alliance is to New Zealand’s defence policy.   

 

Ultimately, the coordinated investment in defence on both sides of the Tasman demonstrates a shared goal to strengthen our militaries in such a way that they can fight together.

 

Combined Operations of the ANZAC Force

 

While Australia has one eye on building the future force that we may need to fight the next war, the other eye is on activities, exercises and operations for the current force.

 

When it comes to our relationship with New Zealand, these activities serve many objectives, such as enhancing interoperability, contributing to the global rules-based order, and supporting Pacific sovereignty.

 

When I think about our combined operations, three recent examples come to mind:

 

First, in September 2024, HMAS Sydney and HMNZS Aotearoa conducted a transit of the Taiwan Strait.

 

This enhanced our interoperability and reinforced our commitment to the global rules-based order through UNCLOS.

 

 

Second, in December 2024, Vanuatu suffered a large earthquake (7.3) that killed 14 people and injured 265 others.  In the aftermath, the Pacific Response Group, or PRG, sent in a team to assess the damage and offer military assistance.

 

The PRG is comprised of militaries from our region (Australia, Fiji, France, New Zealand, PNG and Tonga), and was formed so that we can more coherently respond to calls for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from our neighbours.

 

Through the PRG we can provide support to our Pacific family when they need us, while respecting Pacific sovereignty and regional architecture.

 

Finally, we worked together in February 2025 in response to China’s Task Group 107 sailing down Australia’s East Coast and through the Tasman Sea.

 

Australia and New Zealand conducted a combined surveillance operation of the Task Group, as it circumnavigated Australia and conducted live firings which shut down our Tasman Sea air lines of communication.

 

The combined operation saw coordinated P-8 missions, frigates from both nations conduct surveillance, and the resupply vessel – HMNZS Aotearoa –refuel Australian frigates to extend the duration of their mission.

 

In doing this, we demonstrated effectiveness in combined operations, enhanced interoperability, and supported sovereign security in the Pacific.

 

Concluding Remarks

 

To conclude, Australia and New Zealand with others in the region, face an uncertain world, rising strategic competition and challenges to current norms and rules.

 

We have a deep close relationship born of our shared histories, values and interests.  Our deep trust is the most valuable thing that we share.

 

Our relationship has many dimensions, ranging from economic and trade links to people-to-people links, diplomatic ties, and our military partnership.

 

This military partnership, grounded in the ANZUS Treaty, remains as important today as it ever has been.

 

The deteriorating security environment has prompted a rethink of military strategy on both sides of the Tasman.

 

For Australia, our new strategy of denial through deterrence is enabled through an integrated, focused force.

 

New Zealand, meanwhile, retains a balanced force structure, but is investing heavily in rebuilding its military force into one that can integrate and interoperate with the ADF.

 

There will, of course, be rub-points as we rebuild our militaries in an interoperable way that meets the shared direction of both of our governments.

 

Naturally, we will disagree on some things, because, while very similar, our interests are not identical.

 

But when we do disagree, it is the deep trust and friendship that we have built over more than a century that we lean on to keep our relationship moving forward.  We must never forget the value of that trust.

 

We must also remember that the areas in which we agree and have shared interests far outweigh our differences.

 

I am honoured to be a steward for our unique relationship for the next three years, alongside my Kiwi counterpart in Canberra, New Zealand High Commissioner Andrew Needs, and our respective teams.

 

However, I hope that I have impressed upon you this morning that this relationship is far greater than just one person, one department or even one Government.

 

 

It is the job of each and every Australian and New Zealander in this room to protect our trusting partnership and shepherd it into a flourishing modern alliance.  And to explain this cooperation and tell our story with other partners.

 

I look forward to continuing our work together.

 

Ngā mihi nui.

No reira,

Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa.